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Sustainable Funding for the Arts: 
Earmarked Taxes and Options for Metropolitan Atlanta 
 
Michael Rushton 
 
Executive Summary 
 
On June 13, 2002 the first meeting was held of the Regional Arts Task 
Force, assembled by the Metro Atlanta Chamber of Commerce. Meetings of 
the Task Force through 2002 were open to the public, and a number of 
special “listening sessions” were held in various locations in the Metro area.  
 
The mission of the Task Force is: “To make the Atlanta region a premier 
center for the arts, and for it to be recognized as such.” The Task Force 
members unanimously selected an Arts and Culture Vision Statement: “Arts 
and Culture will be recognized as defining elements of the quality of life in 
the Atlanta region.”  
 
From its very first meeting the Task Force gave a grade of “C” to Atlanta as 
an arts center, and claimed that Atlanta is not achieving its full potential. 
Three “root causes” of the problem were selected as the highest priorities of 
the Task Force: 
• A regional vision and strategy for the arts; 
• A coordinated regional arts leadership; and 
• A sustained regional funding mechanism. 
 
Through the Task Force’s deliberations, the questions arose as to whether 
much could be achieved without stable funding.  
 
This Research Atlanta study, sponsored by SunTrust, considers a type of 
sustained funding mechanism that has been tried in other US cities and 
metro areas, an earmarked revenue source for the arts. It does not address the 
questions of a regional vision and strategy, or a coordinated regional arts 
leadership, although the question of vision, and an articulation of the public 
interest in the support of the arts, are a critical part of any discussion of 
funding sources.   
 
Earmarked taxes can either assign receipts from a single tax base to a 
dedicated end use, or, what is more common for the arts, dedicate a 
proportion of a wider pool of revenue to a dedicated end use. The earmarked 
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taxes familiar to most Americans are the federal government’s 
Manufacturers’ Excise Tax on Gasoline, which is devoted to the Highway 
Trust Fund, and, of course, the Social Security System. Georgia residents in 
particular are most familiar with the earmarking of lottery revenues for 
education. 
 
Although in principle there are as many ways of creating an earmarked tax 
for the arts as there are sources of government revenue, for major 
metropolitan areas in the US there are three options that dominate: the retail 
sales tax; occupancy taxes on hotels, motels and the like (usually simply 
referred to as hotel/motel taxes); and, the property tax. Not surprisingly, 
earmarked taxes for the arts have been implemented using tax bases where 
the city or county has some scope for setting the tax rates. 
 
The study examines the use of earmarked retail sales taxes for the arts in 
Denver, Salt Lake City, St. Paul and Pittsburgh. Denver’s is perhaps the 
best-known; the Scientific and Cultural Facilities District (SCFD) levies a 
one-tenth of one percent sales tax over seven counties of Metropolitan 
Denver. The funds are distributed by the SCFD itself. Four large cultural 
institutions receive guaranteed funding, middle-sized organizations apply for 
funding to the SCFD on a competitive basis, and some funds are distributed 
back to the counties where the monies were collected such that local county 
officials can make recommendations on funding for small community-based 
arts organizations. Salt Lake City’s earmarked tax is also one-tenth of one 
percent. All arts organizations must compete for funds, although the large 
institutions are always reasonably assured of receiving funds. St. Paul levies 
a one-half of one percent sales tax, and one-tenth of those revenues are for 
cultural projects, the bulk of which must be invested in a designated cultural 
district. Finally, Pittsburgh levies a one percent sales tax, of which five 
percent of the revenues are designated for arts and culture.    
 
Hotel/motel occupancy taxes are often used for special purposes; in this 
study the use of hotel/motel taxes for the arts in San Francisco, Houston, St. 
Louis, and Columbus, Ohio are considered. These cities provide interesting 
contrasts in the purposes of using earmarked funds: San Francisco looks to 
fund culturally diverse institutions that will develop works of art at the 
cutting edge, Houston is more focused on arts organizations that will bolster 
the tourism and convention sector, and Columbus and St. Louis aim to 
enhance the cultural opportunities for the community, especially those who 
would otherwise have little access to the arts.   
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St. Louis also uses an earmarked property tax for the funding of five large 
cultural institutions. The St. Louis Zoo Museum District (ZMD) distributes 
funds as a fixed mill rate per institution. The goal of the program is to 
maintain world-class cultural and scientific institutions that will be 
accessible to all residents of the area. 
 
Kansas City and Detroit provide cautionary tales, where proposals for an 
earmarked tax for the arts either got mired in legislative debate without 
actually getting to voters (Kansas City) or which was put before voters but 
was rejected (Detroit). Each case provides lessons for advocates of an 
earmarked tax for Atlanta, since each of these cities faced issues regarding 
the geography of the program: where would tax revenues be collected and 
where would they be spent.   
 
For any proposal for an earmarked tax for the arts, voters will be considering 
who will bear the burden of the tax. Arts advocates will be interested in 
whether the source will provide stable, sustainable funding.  
 
The retail sales tax is paid by consumers of the goods and services that 
comprise the tax base. While a retail sales tax that applied to all goods and 
services would be regressive (i.e. the poor would pay a higher proportion of 
their annual income towards that tax than would the rich), the usual tax 
exemption for necessities mitigates the regressivity. From a resident’s point 
of view another positive aspect of the tax is that at least some proportion will 
be paid by visitors to the area. For arts advocates, the retail sales tax has the 
advantage of generally showing a pattern of stable growth with low 
fluctuations from year to year. Sales tax rates in the five core counties of 
Metro Atlanta range from 5% to 7%, the same range where we find the other 
US cities that have adopted earmarked retail sales taxes for the arts, and so 
there are unlikely to be complaints that Metro sales tax rates are already out 
of line with other jurisdictions. 
 
While the hotel/motel tax is collected for the most part from visitors to the 
area, it is not entirely the case that visitors truly bear all the burden of the 
tax. An increase in the occupancy tax rate will increase the price of visiting 
the area, and by the law of demand we would expect that the number of 
visits would fall. The more demand falls, the more the hotel/motel tax is felt 
by residents in lost income; the burden of the tax is shared between visitors 
and residents. The major drawback of the hotel/motel tax is its instability; 
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the past two years have provided solid confirmation of the uncertainty of 
tourist revenues in regions that have come to depend on them. Although 
hotel/motel taxes are a popular choice for earmarked taxes for the arts, it is 
somewhat paradoxical that such a variable revenue source is applied when 
the very purpose of earmarking is to insulate arts organizations from high 
variance in funding.  
 
The burden of the property tax is not easily classified as progressive or 
regressive. Local officials in Denver report that in the debates surrounding 
their introduction of an earmarked tax, the sales tax was chosen over the 
property tax since the growth potential appeared greater, and that it seemed 
there was less public resistance to a sales tax. On this question there will be 
different opinion from city to city depending on the existing structure of 
taxes and whether one tax in particular is already seen as being too high.  
 
Economists have been divided on whether earmarked taxes are a good or 
bad idea, and the division is not one that can be expressed along the left vs. 
right notions we often find in economic debate in the popular media.  
 
An earmarked tax is a restriction placed on those who make public 
budgeting decisions. It is not perfectly binding, since whatever body enacted 
the tax will always at some point have the option of repealing it, but clearly 
the intent is to place restrictions on how budgets will be drawn. This 
immediately raises the question of why we would want to do this. The 
principal argument against earmarked taxes is that they reduce flexibility in 
budget-making, and cities and counties will often need flexibility in dealing 
with unforeseen contingencies. Where economists have spoken in favor of 
earmarking it is because the reduction in the scope of what decision-makers 
can do is a positive aspect of the tax. 
 
Earmarking revenues is a way for citizens to obtain a commitment on public 
funding that is otherwise a difficult promise for politicians to keep. That is 
why in many cases voters have been willing to accept tax increases only 
when they have a guarantee of where the money will be spent. The federal 
gasoline tax is a good example of a tax increase that has, in the past, been 
tolerated when other tax increases have not. Evidence from the UK suggests 
that voters would be willing to accept tax increases if they were earmarked 
for health care, but not if the revenues were simply going into a general 
fund.  
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Earmarking can have the additional benefits of making the government 
expenditure process more transparent than it would otherwise be, which is 
good not just for achieving a better match between how voters want their 
money spent and how it actually is spent, but also for generally improving 
the democratic ideal. 
 
Any advocate for an earmarked tax for the arts in Metro Atlanta will need to 
be familiar with the strengths and weaknesses of earmarked taxes. That 
being said, the main experience Georgians have had with earmarking, the 
dedication of lottery revenues to education, has been a positive one that 
maintains substantial positive support. 
 
What public interest is served by an earmarked tax for the arts? This is the 
most important question of all. If there is no coherent answer, then any 
advocates of an earmarked tax will be left explaining why they would want 
to support a transfer of money from taxpayers in general to those who 
happen to enjoy attending those cultural events that would be eligible for 
funding.  
 
It will not be enough to claim that the range of organizations receiving 
funding will be large and attract diverse audiences, because it leaves 
unanswered the question of why funding through the private sector, plus 
what public funding already exists, would not be wholly adequate. 
Furthermore, when the public interest is identified it will not only justify the 
new funding mechanism but will also indicate what sort of allocation 
process is appropriate.  
 
Economists who study the arts have identified a number of reasons why 
public support of the arts, beyond what the private sector alone could 
provide, is justified: 
• Left to the private sector alone, the opportunities to share in the 
cultural life of the region will not be distributed equitably, and 
individuals with low income, or who have not had the benefits of a 
family upbringing or schooling that enable them to fully partake in 
our cultural life, or who live in neighborhoods with few cultural 
offerings, will be missing out on a crucial part of a full life. 
• There are benefits from the arts in the community that accrue through 
the building of social capital: the invisible, informal ties that bind our 
society together. By enhancing the opportunities for different citizens 
to get together, especially in amateur cultural organizations where the 
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citizens are actually participating in the activity, not just as spectators, 
we build the social capital that is now seen by many as an important 
determinant of the quality of life in a region.  
• There are in the arts what economists refer to as positive externalities, 
where I will benefit from others taking part in cultural activities even 
when I myself am not a part of those activities in particular. For 
example, I benefit from children having a vibrant arts education 
program in schools, and the opportunity to experience a wide range of 
cultural offerings in the Metro area, because it will improve my 
quality of life to live in a society that is culturally literate and that will 
give support in future to the cultural institutions I value. I will also 
benefit from a culturally vibrant city attracting new residents that will 
add to the cultural and economic life of the region.   
 
Each of these reasons has two things in common. 
 
First, they each identify a public interest in the arts, even for those who are 
not regular attendees of events, whether it be in terms of helping those who 
are for various reasons culturally deprived, or of building community, or 
through changing the cultural life of the area in ways that benefit everyone. 
As stated above, it would be very difficult to persuade the voting public to 
support new funding for the arts if the public benefits are not articulated. 
 
Second, each of these reasons has in common an understanding that our 
cultural traditions, and the fostering of new creations and ideas, are not 
simply an entertaining diversion, although being entertained is certainly a 
part of our cultural life. Our culture is at the core of how we define and 
understand our selves and each other. It is how we express or experience a 
vision for which words alone would never be adequate. It is how we are 
connected to our ancestors who came before us and the generations who will 
come after. The arts are different from other goods. 
 
The residents of Metro Atlanta will differ regarding what is the most 
important public interest in the arts. Some may believe that it is most 
important to stress the cultural development of youth, especially for the 
disadvantaged and the at-risk. Arts education programs, artists-in-schools, 
and after-school programs will be a funding priority. Others will see the 
most gain in the development of community, especially through the 
sustainable funding of small arts nonprofit organizations. Still others might 
believe that directing attention to the pursuit of artistic excellence is the best 
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way to maintain our traditions and inspire future generations. No doubt for 
many people all of these goals will be important, but there will be 
differences in where new public funding could do the most good. 
 
A coherent proposal for an earmarked tax will include an identification of 
the public interest in the arts in Atlanta, and from that the criteria for how 
funds would be allocated should naturally follow. 
 
As we find in the Kansas City and Detroit cases, concerns will inevitably be 
raised about which taxpayers will contribute to the earmarked tax and where 
the funds will be spent. Metro Atlanta’s transportation challenges are 
obvious enough to be taken as a given. Residents distant from central 
Atlanta will raise questions as to whether they will be paying a tax to fund 
arts organizations in the city from which they expect to receive few benefits. 
This takes us back to the previous question: what is the public interest in the 
arts funding?  
 
If the argument is that funding for nonprofit arts organizations is a way to 
build social capital through greater citizen participation, then it will be 
important that the funds from the dedicated revenue source be distributed 
throughout the area covered by the tax, since the essence of social capital is 
in its being local.  
 
If the public interest is in creating greater equality of opportunity to acquire 
cultural experiences, then some geographic redistribution would be called 
for as culturally deprived areas would ideally be the location of more 
allocations than the amounts collected in taxes there, or, perhaps more 
allocations would be made to central cultural organizations well-placed to 
serve the needs of the disadvantaged groups.  
 
If the public interest is in having some “world class” institutions, then there 
may be a geographic redistribution from suburbs and exurbs to the City of 
Atlanta.  
 
In thinking about the public interest, it would unwise to ignore Atlanta’s 
cultural diversity. Cultural diversity comes in many forms, not simply ethnic 
or racial, and works across the different tastes people have for the different 
genres of art. As cultural tastes become more varied, and as there is less 
consensus on the particular cultural value of the high arts versus popular art, 
the case for public funding becomes more difficult to make.  
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When economists first began studying the rationale for public funding of the 
arts, in the 1960s and 1970s, there was an implicit assumption about what 
was meant by “the arts”: it was a very particular artistic heritage, the high art 
tradition of Western Europe. But that assumption can no longer be made. 
 
This does not mean that it will be impossible to secure agreement on a new 
source of sustainable funding for the arts in Metro Atlanta. Cities with 
cultural diversity have been able to create very successful arts funding 
systems. But there is a challenge that needs to be addressed.  
 
Should the allocation process be competitive? From a public interest 
perspective there is much to be said for competition, even for large 
organizations. It forces arts organizations to document how it is that they are 
serving a public interest, it provides citizens with a greater sense of 
accountability to the public, and, often overlooked, it gives new arts 
organizations a chance to gain a foothold. Note that one half of American art 
museums have been founded since 1970; this is not a static sector, and it is 
worthwhile to ask whether the funding allocation process should reflect this. 
 
What arts organizations should be eligible for funding? The St. Louis ZMD 
model focuses on very secure funding for a few large organizations, and it 
seems to have a clear idea of what will be accomplished through that: world 
class institutions available for free admission, and many educational 
programs, for its citizens. Denver, after initially proposing such a model, 
funds a very large number of organizations, and ensures grants to 
community arts organizations in the suburban counties. Once the purpose of 
the public funding is determined, the answer to this question should be 
clearer. 
 
Who should make the allocation decision? There are three distinct methods 
of allocating funds, which might be used in some combination. One method 
is to specify the allocation of funds to specified cultural organizations at the 
outset, so that while a commission may exist to oversee the transfer of funds, 
the commission is not engaged in any decision-making over the allocation. 
An example would be the ZMD in St. Louis. 
 
A second method is to grant the new funds from the earmarked tax to an 
existing arts council or group of councils, to supplement its existing 
programs, which are generally conducted on a competitive basis. An 
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example in this case is the Greater Columbus (Ohio) Arts Council, which 
receives a portion of the local occupancy tax and allocates funds on a 
competitive basis. 
 
The third method is to allocate funds through some body that exists only for 
the purpose of allocating the earmarked revenues, for example the Scientific 
and Cultural Facilities District in Denver. Such a body might allocate its 
funds entirely on a competitive basis, or, as is the case in Denver, through a 
variety of means: statutory allocation to large organizations, a competitive 
process for medium-sized organizations, and funding for community-based 
arts organizations being handled by local government. 
 
Metropolitan Atlanta has a number of arts funding bodies already in place, 
and so a key question would be, if an earmarked tax were adopted, and some 
aspect of the allocation of funds were to be competitive, should some new 
body be created? A new funding body would make sense if the purpose of 
the funding were different from what is typically the goal of programs by the 
county arts councils or the Metropolitan Atlanta Arts Fund. For example, the 
goal of the new funding might be to foster more collaborative projects across 
organizations, if this were seen as a deficiency under the status quo.  
 
It is always a difficult task to estimate the revenues that could be raised from 
the application of an earmarked tax. First, the tax base is constantly shifting 
due to population changes or changes in general economic conditions. 
Second, changes in the tax rates themselves will cause changes in the tax 
base.  
 
That being said, the estimation problems are most likely less for the sales tax 
base than for other tax bases, and on those grounds we can do some rough 
calculations. The seven-county Metropolitan Denver Scientific and Cultural 
Facilities District, and Salt Lake County in Utah, each levy an earmarked 
one-tenth of a sales tax point for the arts and culture. In Denver this tax 
raises about $15 per person, and in Salt Lake about $17 per person. If an 
earmarked tax could be designed that would raise $16 per person in Clayton, 
Cobb, DeKalb, Fulton and Gwinnett counties, with a combined population 
of just over three million persons, total revenues would be about $50 
million. 
 
Some caveats are in order in the interpretation of the $50 million figure. 
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First, it is an approximation, although we can demonstrate that $16 per 
person from one-tenth of one percent of sales tax in the five combined 
counties is not going to be wildly off the mark. 
 
Second, both Denver and Salt Lake use their earmarked revenues for a wide 
range of cultural activities: in Denver over 40% of the revenues raised go to 
the Museum of Science and Nature, the Zoo, and the Botanical Gardens, and 
in Salt Lake over 40% of the revenues go to the Zoo and the Department of 
Parks and Recreation. So if Metro Atlanta were looking for an earmarked tax 
specifically for the arts, one-tenth of one percent of sales tax is actually 
substantially more revenue per person for the arts than is raised in Denver or 
Salt Lake. 
 
Third, following from the second point, it is important to remember that 
sound policy in the arts requires thinking about what programs would best 
serve the interests of the community, and the degree to which public funding 
would need to be a part of those programs, before looking into what revenue 
could be raised from different sources. Only after discussion of the issues 
raised above would it make sense to ask what sort of earmarked tax if any is 
appropriate, and what the revenue target ought to be.    
 
Economists have found that the public seems to have more willingness to 
accept taxes, especially new taxes, when they are earmarked for a particular 
purpose. In the arts, we have seen evidence from a number of US cities 
where earmarked taxes for the arts receive strong voter approval both for 
their implementation and their renewal.  
 
Whether that same support would be found in Metro Atlanta depends on a 
number of factors. Cities where proposals for earmarked taxes for the arts 
have failed to gain approval show us that questions about how funds will be 
distributed across a region, and what the purpose of the funding is, must be 
answered before voters will be willing to give their support. 
 
Beyond this, there needs to be an articulation of the public interest in the 
arts, and in turn what will be the criteria for funded projects. And in 
particular, defining the public interest in the arts will require some 
consensus-building across cultural groups. This is a challenge, but it has 
been done elsewhere, and the different cultural communities of Atlanta 
could benefit in many ways from a discussion of our common interest in 
preserving, experiencing, and enhancing our cultural life. 
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Sustainable Funding for the Arts: 
Earmarked Taxes and Options for Metropolitan Atlanta 
 
Michael Rushton 
 
1. Introduction 
 
On June 13, 2002 the first meeting was held of the Regional Arts Task 
Force, assembled by the Metro Atlanta Chamber of Commerce. Meetings of 
the Task Force through 2002 were open to the public, and a number of 
special “listening sessions” were held in various locations in the Metro area.  
 
The mission of the Task Force is: “To make the Atlanta region a premier 
center for the arts, and for it to be recognized as such.” The Task Force 
members unanimously selected an Arts and Culture Vision Statement: “Arts 
and Culture will be recognized as defining elements of the quality of life in 
the Atlanta region.”  
 
From its very first meeting the Task Force gave a grade of “C” to Atlanta as 
an arts center, and claimed that Atlanta is not achieving its full potential, 
notwithstanding the private contributions to the arts made by residents and 
businesses in Metro Atlanta, and the funding support of the Georgia Council 
for the Arts, County-level arts councils in Fulton, DeKalb and Gwinnett, and 
the Metropolitan Atlanta Arts Fund, now in its tenth year of operations.  
 
Three “root causes” of the problem were selected as the highest priorities of 
the Task Force: 
• A regional vision and strategy for the arts; 
• A coordinated regional arts leadership; and 
• A sustained regional funding mechanism. 
 
Through the Task Force’s deliberations, the questions arose as to whether 
much could be achieved without stable funding. As the press reported of one 
of the Task Force’s meetings: “Metro Atlanta’s top leaders made an 
unprecedented commitment to arts and culture … but until it’s backed up 
with dollars there’s still no telling how far their good intentions will go.”1  
 
                                                 
1 “Agency to push metro arts funding” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, August 30, 2002. 
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This study considers a type of sustained funding mechanism that has been 
tried in other US cities and metro areas, an earmarked revenue source for the 
arts. It does not address the questions of a regional vision and strategy, or a 
coordinated regional arts leadership, although it will become clear reading 
this paper that the question of vision, and an articulation of the public 
interest in the support of the arts, are a critical part of any discussion of 
funding sources.  The study follows a previous Research Atlanta look at the 
arts in Metro Atlanta, Kushner and Brooks (2000), which, like the Chamber 
of Commerce Task Force, gave a rather middling grade to Atlanta’s arts 
economy. 
 
2. A Survey of Earmarked Taxes for the Arts 
 
Earmarked taxes can either assign receipts from a single tax base to a 
dedicated end use, or, what is more common for the arts, dedicate a 
proportion of a wider pool of revenue to a dedicated end use. The earmarked 
taxes familiar to most Americans are the federal government’s 
Manufacturers’ Excise Tax on Gasoline, which is devoted to the Highway 
Trust Fund, and, of course, the Social Security System. Georgia residents in 
particular are most familiar with the earmarking of lottery revenues for 
education. 
 
The highways and Social Security examples have the earmarked tax 
resemble a “user fee”: citizens are contributing to the pool of revenue in a 
way proportional (to a degree) to their use of the good that is being financed.  
However, as is the case with Georgia lotteries, it is not necessary for the 
source of an earmarked tax to be linked in any way to use or benefits from 
whatever public good is being financed.  
 
We will consider some of the issues that have been raised about the principle 
of using earmarked taxes in a later section of the paper. But first, in this 
section, we will take a tour through a selection of US cities that have 
adopted earmarked taxes for the arts.  
 
We find that although in principle there are as many ways of creating an 
earmarked tax for the arts as there are sources of government revenue, for 
major metropolitan areas in the US there are three options that dominate: the 
retail sales tax; occupancy taxes on hotels, motels and the like (usually 
simply referred to as hotel/motel taxes); and, the property tax. 
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There are other options that we find applied at the state or national level. For 
example: 
• Lottery revenues: The Georgia lottery has proven to be 
remarkably politically successful as an earmarked tax for 
education. In the UK, and in many Canadian provinces, lottery 
revenues are earmarked for the arts. 
• License plates: California, Florida, Indiana, Tennessee and 
Texas all have specialty “arts tag” license plates. This is not so 
much an earmarked tax as it is the use of the government 
collection of license fees to facilitate voluntary contributions by 
residents to state arts agencies (or, as in Florida, to county arts 
agencies, as the funds are distributed according to the county 
where the money was raised). In some cases the revenues raised 
through this method can be substantial: in Tennessee, for 
example, two-thirds of its state arts council grants budget 
comes from license plate revenues. Typically a patron of the 
license plate program will pay between $25 and $35 for a 
specialty plate. Looking to Georgia’s neighbors, we find that 
the take-up rate has been substantially stronger in Tennessee 
than in Florida. If Georgia implemented a license plate scheme 
and raised the same revenues per capita as are annually raised 
in Tennessee, the take would be about $3.9 million per year. 
However, if the revenues per capita were on a par with Florida, 
the expected take would be about $400,000. Note that license 
plates for the arts are not solely about raising revenue; they also 
raise awareness of the arts and hopefully help build public 
support. 
• Corporate Filing Fees: Arizona and Florida each use a portion 
of the filing fees of for-profit corporations to fund a state arts 
and culture trust fund. 
 
But for metropolitan areas, earmarked taxes for the arts have been 
implemented using tax bases where the city or county has some scope for 
setting the tax rates, which is why we see the dominance of sales, 
hotel/motel, and property taxes. 
 
Retail Sales Tax: Denver 
 
Revenue Source: Denver’s Scientific and Cultural Facilities District (SCFD) 
distributes funds raised through a one-tenth of one percent sales tax, 
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introduced in 1989 (and reaffirmed by voters in 1994 with 57% of the vote, 
with a sunset clause for 2006), over seven counties of Metropolitan Denver. 
Denver residents pay, in total, a retail sales tax of 7.2%. In 2001 $37 million 
was granted to more than 300 organizations.2 
 
Distribution: The SCFD has a ten-member Board of Directors, with each of 
the seven county commissioners appointing one member (except in Denver 
county, where the City Council selects the member), and three members 
appointed by the Colorado governor. 
 
By statute the four Tier I organizations in the district receive 59% of the 
total funds, this proportion being divided as follows: 
• 33% to the Denver Museum of Nature and Science 
• 28% to the Denver Art Museum 
• 26% to the Denver Zoo, and 
• 15% to the Denver Botanical Gardens. 
These organizations can also apply for additional funding on an annual 
basis, with applications reviewed by the SCFD Board, which uses the 
criteria of regional impact, artistic quality, accessibility (i.e. diversification 
of audience, board, staff, or volunteers), need, collaboration, and innovation. 
Even though they are guaranteed funding, they are still required to report on 
an annual basis how funds were used. 
 
Tier II organizations receive 28% of funds; these organizations must have 
been in existence for at least two years and have annual operating income of 
at least $900,000. Allocations to Tier II organizations are determined by the 
SCFD Board. Tier III organizations are the “local” arts organizations, and 
receive 13% of the funds. The distribution to each county is proportionate to 
the funds raised there. At this tier the local county cultural council receives 
proposals and then presents a funding plan to the SCFD commissioners. 
Organizations receiving funding must be either nonprofit or an agency of 
local government, and must principally benefit residents of the cultural 
district.  
 
Discussion: Local officials note the great acrimony that greeted the initial 
proposals for an earmarked tax that would, as in St. Louis (discussed below), 
be directed only at what are now known as “Tier I” institutions. Negotiations 
eventually led to the three-tier structure. 
                                                 
2 Institutional details are available at the SCFD website: [http://www.scfd.org]. 
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Asked to describe the successes of the program, an official wrote: 
 
Major accomplishments for the district have been to improve 
accessibility to cultural programming for the residents of the district, 
encouraging and achieving collaborations between organizations 
across county and tier boundaries in areas of marketing, development 
and education, creating and developing education departments and 
programs in the cultural institutions, and allowing individuals to begin 
pursuing careers in culture rather than merely filling jobs. The district 
has also created a sense of community identity for cultural institutions 
– it provides a framework for beginning to identify who are 
colleagues, and who are peers. Also for the first time, data has been 
collected on the cultural institutions in the district – revenue levels, 
attendance, geographic and demographic service provisions, etc.3   
 
A downside, always possible with an earmarked tax, is that arts funding at 
the state level has dropped to fiftieth out of fifty states, with critics 
contending that the state government is using the SCFD as an excuse for 
cutting state-level funding.4 The criticism is perhaps unwarranted, since even 
in 1988, before the SCFD was created, Colorado ranked 47th in state arts 
agency legislative appropriations, and has since that time consistently ranked 
near the bottom in interstate rankings.5 Still, the issue reminds us of the 
tensions that might arise between a metropolitan area adopting an earmarked 
tax and the regions of the state outside of the metro area who might find 
their main sources of funding cut as a result.  
 
That being said, Denver is generally regarded as a success story in local arts 
funding. The Kushner and Brooks (2000) Research Atlanta study ranked 
Denver high in number of arts nonprofits per capita, and in revenues of arts 
nonprofits per capita. The arts are a salient issue in local politics; the 2003 
mayoral election campaign’s first candidate debate was devoted to arts and 
culture.6  
 
 
                                                 
3 Correspondence with the author. 
4 “Why we’re last.” Denver Post, January 26, 2003. 
5 National Assembly of State Arts Agencies, State Arts Agency Public Funding Sourcebook, (Washington 
DC, 2003). 
6 “7 mayoral candidates offer ideas to promote the arts.” Denver Post, January 22, 2003. 
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Retail Sales Tax: Salt Lake 
 
Revenue Source: Salt Lake County, which includes Salt Lake City and its 
suburbs, began a one-tenth of one percent sales tax in 1997 to fund the arts 
and recreation, the Zoo, Arts and Parks, or ZAP tax.7 Salt Lake City 
residents pay a total retail sales tax of 6.6%, which is divided into 4.75 for 
the state and 1.85 for the city. In 2001 the tax collected just over $15.5 
million. 
 
Distribution: The County takes 1.5% of revenues to administer the program, 
and then distributes as follows: 
• Tier I (large; averaging over $287,000 per year in expenditures) 
organizations (22 in number) received 52.5% 
• Tier II (small; averaging less than $287,000 per year in 
expenditures) organizations (92 in number) received 5% 
• Hogle Zoo received 12.5% 
• Parks and Recreation 30%. 
All organizations seeking funding must submit an application with a specific 
plan of how money will be spent. An advisory board reviews the arts 
applications and makes a recommendation to the Salt Lake County Council, 
which makes the final determination on the amount of funding going to each 
organization.  
 
Discussion: The allocation process has not been without controversy. The 
County Council recently overruled its advisory board on appeal from two 
organizations which had initially been rejected for funding, one because it 
was a heritage park of early Mormon life in the state that did not have an 
obvious link to the funding criteria of “natural history, art, music, theater or 
dance”, and one because it was a theater recently converted from for-profit 
to nonprofit status, reportedly precisely because it would create eligibility 
for ZAP revenues, that had no obvious public benefit.8 The local press noted 
that the latter case may have been driven by the politics of geography, being 
one of the few Tier I organizations not located in Salt Lake City.    
 
                                                 
7 Many details of the program can be found at its website [http://www.slcozap.org].  
8 “Refine ZAP Tax Rules.” Salt Lake Tribune, August 9, 2002. 
 7
Tier I organizations are reasonably assured of receiving funds, which are 
based on qualifying expenditures. Tier II organizations also receive funds 
based on qualifying expenditures, but also on such factors as benefit to the 
community, how they plan to use the funds, and whether there has been 
previous funding. 
 
Local officials report that a major goal of the program was to provide the 
stability necessary for arts organizations to enhance their programs and, 
notably, outreach to the community. High popular support for the tax is 
cited, with a recent poll showing 86% would vote for a continuation of the 
tax. Note the contrast with when the ZAP was initially proposed; some arts 
organizations were opposed on the grounds that it might make private 
fundraising more difficult or that they might be left out of the program. 
There was a particular concern among smaller organizations about the 
amount going to Tier I organizations. But officials report that once the ZAP 
was in place a consensus in support of the program developed.  
 
The main challenge facing the program is that more organizations are 
competing for funding, which might lead to diminution. On the other hand, 
this might be seen as a sign of a valuable cultural dynamism.   
 
Retail Sales Tax: St. Paul 
 
Revenue Source: In 1993 the Minnesota State Legislature authorized a ½ 
cent sales tax, known as the Sales Tax Revitalization Program (STAR) for 
St. Paul. For St. Paul this is the only city sales tax; the state tax rate is 6.5% 
so retail sales in St. Paul are taxed at a total rate of 7%. The St. Paul City 
Council designated 10 percent of the STAR revenues for grants and loans 
for cultural projects, and in 1997 began to also award funding for 
organizational development in cultural organizations. The cultural portion of 
the STAR was initially awarding just over $1 million annually, but this has 
fallen in recent years, and for 2002 the allocation was $907,000.  
 
Distribution: At least 80 percent of cultural STAR revenues must be invested 
within a designated cultural district, with the remaining funds applicable to 
other organizations within the St. Paul city limits. Operational grants are 
limited to 25 percent of the average annual budget for the previous three 
years to a maximum of $50,000. Other grants or loans must be matched on a 
one-for-one basis. A nine-member Cultural District Board (with five 
members appointed by the Mayor with the approval of the City Council, and 
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four members elected by cultural organizations in the cultural district) 
administers a competitive application process, which includes interviews of 
eligible applicants that are open to the public (although no public testimony 
is given) and then makes recommendations to the Mayor and City Council. 
Only organizations may apply for funds; there is no funding for individual 
artists.   
 
Discussion: The Cultural STAR program lists as its goals: (1) to develop and 
improve cultural facilities; (2) to strengthen cultural organizations; and, (3) 
to attract audiences to downtown St. Paul. Applicants are rated by the 
following criteria: 
• Impact of the project on the applicant organization and/or the cultural 
life of St. Paul; 
• Quality of the proposal and project plan; 
• Demonstrated ability of the applicant organization to complete the 
project as planned. 
As the name of the program suggests, revitalization is the key objective. The 
main portion of STAR revenue is for capital projects in neighborhood 
revitalization, and the cultural component is clearly meant to complement 
this overarching goal. The arts community is generally pleased with the 
commitment to the arts in St. Paul shown by Mayor Randy Kelly, who has 
pledged to create “a mecca for artists, theater, culture, fine arts and 
entertainment in a way that has revitalized great cities across America.”9 A 
special feature of St. Paul is that it is one city in a set of twins, and there is a 
strong sense of competition with Minneapolis. The Kushner and Brooks 
(2000) Research Atlanta study comparing different metropolitan areas 
ranked Minneapolis-St. Paul highly in terms of support for nonprofit arts 
organizations, in many arts indicators coming first among the twenty 
metropolitan areas in the study, but this success masks the trends within the 
twin cities area, and so in St. Paul there remains a sense that dedicated and 
active support of the arts is a continuing need.   
 
Retail Sales Tax: Pittsburgh 
 
Revenue Source: Allegheny County, which includes the city of Pittsburgh, 
has established the Allegheny Regional Asset District (ARAD), which 
imposes a 1 percent sales tax (on top of an existing state sales tax of 6%, 
giving a total sales tax rate of 7%). Of the proceeds, 25 percent goes to 
                                                 
9 “Kelly smoothes bumps on way to building St. Paul arts plan.” St. Paul Star Tribune, July 14, 2002. 
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municipal governments in the county, 25 percent goes to the county 
government, and 50 percent goes to ARAD. In 2003 expected proceeds to 
ARAD are $75.3 million. The largest share of this goes to libraries, followed 
by parks. In 2003 just over $4 million goes to grants for nonprofit arts and 
humanities organizations. 
 
Distribution: The allocation of funds is determined by a seven-member 
Board of Directors, consisting of four members appointed by the County 
Chief Executive, two by the Mayor of Pittsburgh, and one elected by the 
other six members. The Board of Directors also appoints a twenty-seven 
person advisory board to provide public input and to comment on policies 
and procedures. Each proposed allocation requires the approval of at least 
six members of the Board of Directors. Funds go to arts organizations of all 
sizes, with priority given to organizations that make special efforts at 
outreach to youth, especially those that are traditionally underserved by 
cultural organizations.  
 
Discussion: In the Kushner and Brooks (2000) Research Atlanta study 
Pittsburgh ranked high in total revenues of arts nonprofits per capita, even 
though Pittsburgh’s per capita income was relatively low. There is 
competition in ARAD’s funding between libraries, parks, “special facilities” 
(the zoo, conservatory, and similar institutions), and sports facilities, but 
support for the public funding of arts was given a boost when an 2002 
advisory committee to ARAD regarding its priorities through the next five 
years recommended establishing a guarantee of at least 5 percent of ARAD’s 
budget to go to arts and culture. 
 
The special sales tax was implemented because of a need for additional 
revenues at the county and municipal level combined with unwillingness to 
increase property taxes. ARAD cites the benefits of using a sales tax as the 
low administration cost (since it is simply an add-on to the state sales tax), 
the estimate that 25 percent of sales tax revenues come from non-residents, 
and that an extensive list of exemptions from the tax, especially necessities, 
keeps the tax from being regressive (we return to this question later in the 
study). 
 
Hotel/Motel Tax: San Francisco 
 
Revenue Source: The Grants for the Arts/San Francisco Hotel Tax Fund 
(GFTA) was established in 1961, the first in the nation. The hotel tax rate is 
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14 percent, and of each dollar raised by this tax 8.5 cents is allocated to 
grants for the arts; i.e. the earmarked tax for the arts is effectively a hotel tax 
rate of 1.2 percent. For 2002/03 total expenditures were $15.5 million, of 
which 4 percent is applied to administration expenses and the remaining 96 
percent goes directly to support of the arts. 
 
Distribution: Over 80 percent of the GFTA budget goes to general 
operations support grants, to a large number of organizations (to illustrate, 
for 2002-03 there were grants of at least $7,500 to each of thirty-three dance 
organizations). The rest of the funding was devoted to special grants, support 
services, and cultural tourism. 
 
GFTA staff review applications, make site visits and perform consultations 
with experts in the field, and then present recommendations to a Citizens 
Advisory Committee, meant to assure public accountability. The Advisory 
Committee in turn makes funding recommendations to the Mayor. 
 
Discussion: In its own statements the GFTA claims that its “foremost goal is 
to be a stable, dependable base of support for organizations that continue to 
meet the funding criteria. Emphasis is placed on the cultural diversity of its 
funding recipients, with a goal “to contribute meaningfully to the 
presentation and enhancement of existing art forms while assuring the ability 
of others to experiment, to dare, and to find new as yet untested ways of 
adding to our cultural lives.”10 
 
San Francisco has an international reputation as a city of cultural diversity, 
excellence, and excitement, and the GFTA has a clear mandate to maintain 
this status. 
 
Hotel/Motel Tax: Houston 
 
Revenue Source: The state of Texas levies a hotel/motel tax rate of 6 
percent, and selected counties are permitted to impose a tax in addition to 
the six percent. These local taxes must be used to promote tourism and the 
hotel and convention industry (i.e. they are earmarked and cannot be used 
for general revenues), but the scope is defined widely enough that this 
includes expenditures on the arts. The statutes set a limit for the county add-
on of 7 percent, but this can be exceeded with special permission. Houston 
                                                 
10 [http://www.sfgfta.org/grants_html/hist.html]. 
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and Harris County levy an 11 percent tax, for a total occupancy tax of 17 
percent (very high by national standards). Houston allocates 19 percent of its 
hotel tax revenues to the Cultural Arts Council of Houston and Harris 
County (CACHH). Note this is a greater amount than most Texas counties, 
where on average 11.7 percent of hotel tax revenues are devoted to the arts.11 
This was the major source of funding for the CACHH, which also receives a 
smaller amount from the Texas Commission on the Arts. In 2002 CACHH 
awarded $6.8 million to 179 arts nonprofit organizations. 
 
Distribution: The CACHH is governed by a twenty-six-member volunteer 
board of directors and a set of eight subcommittees that oversee program 
operations. Funding is for operations and technical support for nonprofit arts 
organizations of all sizes. An innovation adopted in 2003 to streamline the 
application process is a move to a two-year funding cycle. This strikes a 
balance between ensuring that new arts organizations are eligible for 
funding, while recognizing that most organizations receiving funding in one 
year would ordinarily also win funding in the following year. 
 
Discussion: The CACHH places somewhat more stress than other local arts 
councils on promoting tourism and the hotel and convention industry, owing 
to guidelines set out in the Texas Tax Code.  
 
The Kushner and Brooks (2000) study ranks Houston next to Atlanta in 
terms of the number of arts nonprofits per capita, in the lower end of their 
twenty-city sample, but Houston is in the middle of the sample when it 
comes to total revenues for arts nonprofits per capita. Like Atlanta, Houston 
has a large minority share of the population, but unlike Atlanta, Houston has 
a low degree of suburbanization.     
 
Hotel/Motel Tax: Columbus, Ohio 
 
Revenue Source: Columbus levies a hotel/motel tax rate of 15.75 percent, 
which currently raises $11 million per year; the Greater Columbus Arts 
Council (GCAC) receives 25 per cent of this tax, to a maximum of $3.3 
million. In its most recent annual report, for 2001, GCAC was allotted the 
$3.3 million maximum. The total budget of GCAC for 2001 was $4.6 
                                                 
11 Texas Department of Economic Development, Texas Local Hotel Tax Report 2001 
[http://research.travel.state.tx.us/tourism/hotelmot/Tax_Report_File.pdf]. 
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million, with additional funding coming from corporate support and the 
Ohio Arts Council; we note the earmarked tax is almost ¾ of its total budget. 
 
Distribution: Funding is through a competitive application system through 
GCAC. In 2001 $2.5 million went to community funding projects, including 
funds for operating support, project support, technical assistance, and a 
community arts fund that provides unrestricted support to small arts groups. 
GCAC also awards individual artist fellowships. Applicants are required to 
show an ability to raise matching funds, artistic excellence and community 
participation and governance. 
 
Discussion: The GCAC stresses in its literature that the goal of its funding is 
to enhance the cultural opportunities for communities, families and children, 
with programs designed primarily for tourists explicitly given a lower 
priority. 
 
The GCAC funds a community arts education program, which represents an 
interesting example of an arts council partnering with the local public school 
system. GCAC funds an artists-in-schools program, and “Children of the 
Future,” an after school program that involves at-risk youth in cultural 
activities. 
 
Hotel/Motel Tax: St. Louis 
 
Revenue Source: St. Louis City and County levies a 3.75 percent hotel/motel 
tax. Of the amount collected, 11/15 goes to the St. Louis Convention and 
Visitors Commission, and 4/15 goes to the Regional Arts Commission of St. 
Louis. In 2001 it awarded $3.35 million in grants to 195 organizations for 
operating support, and $3.56 million in total grants.   
 
Distribution: Nonprofit arts organizations (not including the art museum, 
which is part of the Zoo Museum District, discussed below) apply for 
funding in a competitive process. The fifteen-member Commission is 
appointed by the Mayor and the County Executive. They in turn select a 
citizen panel, with nominations from the community, who review the 
funding proposals. The citizen panelists are expected to have good 
knowledge of at least one of the arts forms funded, and to have an 
understanding of the St. Louis community. The selection of the citizen panel 
also aims to achieve cultural diversity. 
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Discussion: Like the previous example of Columbus, applicants are expected 
to demonstrate the cultural benefits to the local community, not just visitors. 
Applicants are required to have a “demonstrable level of public outreach 
programs.” A “balanced scorecard” approach is used in ranking applications, 
with 40 points for artistic merit, 20 points for cultural or economic impact, 
20 points for accountable and effective management, and 20 points for 
audience development.  
 
Property Tax: St. Louis 
 
Revenue Source: The Zoo Museum District (ZMD) was founded in 1972 
and now funds five institutions: the Zoo, Science Center, Botanical Garden, 
Historical Society, and the Art Museum. The funding is a portion of city and 
county property taxes that in 2002 secured $52.6 million (note over 80 
percent of this revenue is from the primarily suburban St. Louis County). 
The total property tax rate is 22.2 cents per $100 assessed valuation. Note 
that the ZMD funding is substantially more than distributed by the Regional 
Arts Commission of St. Louis, discussed above, which has annual grants just 
over $3 million. The District retains 2% of the funds for administration, but 
typically uses less than 1%, and distributes the remainder to the five eligible 
institutions.   
 
Distribution: An eight-member Board oversees the District, with four 
members appointed by the Mayor of St. Louis and four by the County 
Executive. Only the five institutions listed above receive funding, with each 
receiving funding according to the mill rate that has been approved by 
voters. The current rates are:  
• Zoo   6.1 cents per $100 assessed valuation  
• Art Museum 6.1 
• History Museum 3.8 
• Science Center 3.1 
• Botanical Garden 3.1  
 
Discussion: The Zoo Museum District (ZMD) is not primarily about arts 
organizations, but it still serves as a potential model for the arts in other 
cities like Atlanta, especially if the primary goal of the earmarked tax were 
to develop a small set of large-sized world-class cultural institutions. 
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Local officials cite the success of the program, which has broad popular 
support. They note that the funding allows residents to have access to world-
class institutions at no admission fees (except the Botanical Garden), and the 
organizations perform substantial outreach especially in conjunction with 
schools. 
 
However, a cultural assessment of St. Louis noted that the success of its 
large institutions (note that although the symphony is not part of the ZMD, it 
is a very successful organization in terms of private fundraising) can cause 
observers to overlook the difficult circumstances facing medium-sized 
institutions (Wyszomirski, 2002, notes that this is a national problem, not 
just one applying to St. Louis).12 This is especially true at present, as dire 
fiscal conditions at the state level have caused the Governor to propose 
eliminating all funding at that level.13   
 
Kushner and Brooks (2000) found that St. Louis was not a strong performer 
in its measures of nonprofit arts activity, with a number of arts nonprofits 
per capita and total revenues of arts nonprofits per capita in the bottom half 
of the twenty-city survey, in each measure very close to Atlanta.  
 
3. Two Cautionary Tales 
 
In this section we consider two recent cases where there was an opportunity 
for a new earmarked tax for the arts that failed. 
 
Kansas City 
 
Metropolitan Kansas City has the complication of spanning two states. 
During August of 2002, an initiative promoted by the Arts Council of 
Metropolitan Kansas City for a one-eighth-cent sales tax to be applied on 
either side of the state line went to the Jackson County (MO) legislature, in 
order to secure a place on the ballot in the November general elections. The 
proposal was known as “Bistate II,” since there had been a previous bi-state 
earmarked tax for developing Union Station. In the county legislature, 
supporters claimed that putting the initiative on the ballot would be 
relatively costless, and that there was likelihood of public support for the 
initiative, however: “several legislators said the arts community had not 
                                                 
12 “Arts Funding in St. Louis” [http://www.stlouis2004.org/html/study/artsfunding.html]. 
13 “Missouri Arts Council must plan for loss of state funding,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, February 1, 2003. 
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offered enough information about what they would do with the tax money. 
‘We have an obligation to the taxpayers that we don’t fork over $240 million 
with no accountability,’ said Victor Callahan, legislative chairman. ‘It’s 
missing all the essential elements needed to put it before voters.’”14 
 
The sales tax initiative followed on the heels of an earlier proposal from the 
Chamber of Commerce of Greater Kansas City that would have imposed the 
earmarked sales tax for twenty years not only for the arts but also for sports 
stadiums. But uncertainty over the economy and a lease agreement with the 
Major League Baseball franchise led Chamber officials to want to postpone 
any such initiative until 2004, and this delay led arts groups to push for an 
arts only tax instead, which envisioned $40 million for an arts center and the 
rest of the funds divided amongst arts organizations of all sizes.15  
 
In the end the Jackson County legislature did give approval to a form of 
earmarked tax, but one that would have mandated a large proportion of the 
funds from the bi-state tax be spent in that county. Backers of the proposal 
initially brought to the County legislature realized this would have little 
chance of electoral success: 
 
And with much of the rest of the proposed Bistate II revenues already 
going to Missouri-side projects, anyone could see this laundry list 
from Jackson County was not going to play well west of State Line. 
You may convince the average guy in Olathe [Kansas] to raise his 
taxes for a major performing arts center downtown. But $40 million 
on a performing arts center in far off Independence? That’s not going 
to fly even if he’s sympathetic to the cultural privations of Eastern 
Jackson County.16 
 
The claim is made in Kansas City that a proposal linking arts and major 
sports would have little chance of success, because crumbling public 
infrastructure, especially roads, made investing large amounts in sports 
stadiums an unpopular idea; however, a tax for the arts alone might have a 
chance for success.17  
 
                                                 
14 “Ballot measure for Kansas City Arts funding clears hurdle.” Kansas City Star, August 13, 2002. 
15 Ibid. 
16 “Jackson County leaders learn the art of killing the deal.” 
[http://www.kansascity.com/mld/kansascity/news/columnists/mike_hendricks/3904604.htm] posted August 
21, 2002. 
17 “The power of art” Kansas City Magazine, November 2002. 
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Detroit 
 
On November 5, 2002, voters in Metropolitan Detroit’s Wayne and Oakland 
Counties defeated Proposal K, an earmarked tax for the arts.18 Proposal K 
was a 0.5-mill assessment on residential and commercial properties, 
expected to raise $46 million per year. The tax would be levied for ten years. 
Two-thirds of the funds would have gone to seventeen designated large and 
medium sized cultural institutions in the two counties, with the remaining 
funds being allocated to local communities. A council of nine members, 
chosen to ensure geographical balance, would have had oversight regarding 
the distribution of the funds.19 
 
Michigan has had a turbulent history of arts funding. In 1991 Governor John 
Engler declared himself philosophically opposed to taxpayer funding of the 
arts, and eliminated the state arts council. In 1996 a reorganized Michigan 
Council for the Arts and Cultural Affairs was formed, and gave some 
stability until 2003, when Governor Jennifer Granholm, in general a 
supporter of arts funding (as arts advocates in the state acknowledge), cut the 
state arts budget in half as a result of severe fiscal pressure.20  
 
Proposal K was meant, in part, to insulate arts organizations from economic 
fluctuations. Its failure, following a narrow defeat for a similar proposal in 
the year 2000, has been seen as a last chance for such a tax in Metropolitan 
Detroit.21 The Proposal required at least 50 percent support from suburban 
Oakland County, and 60 percent support from Wayne County, which 
includes the City of Detroit. The measure failed in each county, gaining 46 
percent in Oakland and 57 percent in Wayne. 
 
Why did the Proposal fail? There was a concerted effort by arts groups for 
passage, and $3 million of financing for the campaign. Commenting on the 
defeat, Steve Hemp, president of Henry Ford Museum & Greenfield Village 
(which was slated to receive $4 million from the new funding) said, “We 
made a compelling case, but voters just don’t understand what it takes to 
                                                 
18 “Arts, recreation tax fails again.” Detroit Free Press, November 6, 2002. 
19 “Facts about Proposal K.” Detroit Free Press, October 7, 2002. 
20 “Governor proposes cutting arts funding in half.” Detroit Free Press, March 7, 2003. 
21 “Proposal K: sink or swim.” Detroit Free Press, October 7, 2002. 
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fund cultural institutions,”22 which we would note is, first, not necessarily 
true, and second, unlikely to be a sentiment that will increase voter support 
for any future initiatives. 
 
The local press reports on four kinds of opposition that were raised about the 
tax: 
• It had been rejected previously by voters; 
• The arts should in general be market-driven; 
• The tax would be levied on some low-income residents who 
would have neither the time nor the income to visit the cultural 
institutions; and 
• The tax would be levied on residents of two counties when 
people from neighboring counties would receive some of the 
benefits of the funding (by visiting Metro area attractions) 
without paying for them.23 
 
We have no way of knowing whether any of these four sentiments, or 
something else entirely, was behind the rejection of the tax. Could the 
concern be general uncertainty about economic conditions? We should not 
expect this to have an effect. After all, the purpose of earmarking a tax is 
that it will be in place regardless of swings in the economy or government 
budget deficits. If people were unwilling to vote for an earmarked tax 
because “the time was not right” it raises serious questions about whether it 
would ever be a good idea to have such a tax. 
 
4. Earmarked Taxes for the Arts: General Considerations 
 
Table 1 summarizes some of the questions and options for earmarked taxes 
for the arts, considering the various possible goals of the program, what 
institutions would receive funding, how the funds would be allocated, and 
what tax base. As the brief tour of some other US cities will have made 
clear, there are many possible combinations of answers to these questions. 
This part of the study is devoted to looking in more depth at these questions. 
 
                                                 
22 “Arts, recreation tax fails again.” Op. cit. 
23 “Proposal K: sink or swim.” Op. cit. 
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Table 1: Options for Earmarked Taxes 
 
Objectives Who Receives 
Funding? 
Who Decides? Tax Base 
Fostering 
excellence in the 
arts 
Large, 
established 
organizations 
Newly-formed 
body allocates 
based on 
competitive 
process 
Retail Sales Tax 
Arts education 
and the 
development of 
knowledge and 
appreciation of 
the arts 
Large and 
medium-sized 
organizations 
No competition: 
all funding set by 
statutory 
allocation 
Hotel/Motel 
Occupancy Tax 
Providing 
improved access 
to the arts for 
those with 
otherwise limited 
opportunities  
Arts 
organizations of 
all sizes 
Funding of large 
organizations by 
statute, of 
smaller 
organizations by 
competition 
Property Tax 
Building 
community and 
social capital 
Community-
based arts 
organizations 
only 
 
Funds used to 
supplement 
programs of 
existing arts 
council(s) 
 
Attracting 
tourism and 
convention 
visitors 
Arts 
organizations 
focused on 
attracting visitors
  
 
Note the possible combinations in this Table are many: for example, a 
metropolitan area might choose to use an earmarked portion of the retail 
sales tax to provide improved access to the arts for those who otherwise have 
limited opportunities, through funding arts organizations of all sizes through 
the programs of existing public arts councils. 
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How do the three tax bases compare? 
 
For any proposal for an earmarked tax for the arts, voters will be considering 
who will bear the burden of the tax. Arts advocates will be interested in 
whether the source will provide stable, sustainable funding. We consider 
each of these aspects for the three usual tax bases for arts funding. 
 
Retail Sales Tax:  
• The retail sales tax is paid by consumers of the goods and services 
that comprise the tax base. While a retail sales tax that applied to all 
goods and services would be regressive (i.e. the poor would pay a 
higher proportion of their annual income towards that tax than would 
the rich), the usual tax exemption for necessities mitigates the 
regressivity. From a resident’s point of view another positive aspect of 
the tax is that at least some proportion will be paid by visitors to the 
area. 
• For arts advocates, the retail sales tax has the advantage of generally 
showing a pattern of stable growth with low fluctuations from year to 
year. Sales tax rates in the five core counties of Metro Atlanta range 
from 5% to 7%, the same range where we find the other US cities that 
have adopted earmarked retail sales taxes for the arts, and so there are 
unlikely to be complaints that Metro sales tax rates are already out of 
line with other jurisdictions. 
 
Hotel/Motel Tax: 
 
• While the hotel/motel tax is collected for the most part from visitors to 
the area, it is not entirely the case that visitors truly bear all the burden 
of the tax. An increase in the occupancy tax rate will increase the 
price of visiting the area, and by the law of demand we would expect 
that the number of visits would fall. The more demand falls, the more 
the hotel/motel tax is felt by residents in lost income; the burden of 
the tax is shared between visitors and residents. Estimating how the 
true burden of the tax would be divided is a very difficult task. But we 
can make the following generalization: the more that the area is 
competing for visitors on the basis of price with other jurisdictions – 
as might be the case if conventions were a substantial proportion of 
the total visitors to the area – the more a hotel/motel tax will be felt in 
the local economy as an economic burden. The more that visitors are 
coming to the area with less regard for price, perhaps because of very 
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fine amenities, the more that the burden of the tax will be paid by 
those visitors. It is no surprise that San Francisco chose a hotel/motel 
tax for its arts funding. 
• The major drawback of the hotel/motel tax is its instability; the past 
two years have provided solid confirmation of the uncertainty of 
tourist revenues in regions that have come to depend on them. 
Although, as we have seen above in this study, hotel/motel taxes are a 
popular choice for earmarked taxes for the arts, it is somewhat 
paradoxical that such a variable revenue source is applied when the 
very purpose of earmarking is to insulate arts organizations from high 
variance in funding.  
 
Property Tax: 
 
• The burden of the property tax is not easy to discern. Pechman and 
Okner (1974) find that if we assume a fixed supply of housing and 
improvements, so that all of the property tax is borne by landowners, 
then the property tax is not easily classified as progressive or 
regressive. However, if the assumption is that while landowners bear 
the burden of the portion of the tax falling on land, the rest of the 
burden is borne by the users of the improvements (who, of course, 
might also be owners), then the property tax is regressive throughout 
the entire income distribution. Davies, St-Hilaire and Whalley (1984) 
take us beyond asking about what portion of a person’s annual income 
is paid to a particular tax, and ask what portion of a person’s lifetime 
income goes to that tax, which is probably more relevant to the 
property tax. In general, lifetime income is more equally distributed 
than annual income across the population. They find that the property 
tax is actually slightly progressive when we ask how lifetime property 
taxes paid varies with lifetime income.  
• Local officials in Denver report that in the debates surrounding their 
introduction of an earmarked tax, the sales tax was chosen over the 
property tax since the growth potential appeared greater, and that it 
seemed there was less public resistance to a sales tax. On this question 
there will be different opinion from city to city depending on the 
existing structure of taxes and whether one tax in particular is already 
seen as being too high.  
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Is earmarking taxes good public policy? 
 
Economists have been divided on whether earmarked taxes are a good or 
bad idea, and the division is not one that can be expressed along the left vs. 
right notions we often find in economic debate in the popular media.  
 
The first thing we note is that an earmarked tax is a restriction placed on 
those who make public budgeting decisions. It is not perfectly binding, since 
whatever body enacted the tax will always at some point have the option of 
repealing it, but clearly the intent is to place restrictions on how budgets will 
be drawn. This immediately raises the question of why we would want to do 
this: after all, is it not better to allow decision-makers in the public sector as 
much flexibility as possible in choosing an allocation of spending that best 
satisfies the public interest? In fact this is the principal argument against 
earmarked taxes: they reduce flexibility in budget-making, and cities and 
counties will often need flexibility in dealing with unforeseen contingencies. 
 
Any argument in favor of an earmarked tax for the arts will have to address 
the criticism that the earmarking reduces the ability of public budget-makers 
to deal with changing circumstances. In general, where economists have 
spoken in favor of earmarking it is because the reduction in the scope of 
what decision-makers can do is a positive aspect of the tax. 
 
The way to approach this is to think in terms of the implicit “contract” that is 
made between voters and politicians. Politicians make promises on what 
priorities they will bring to office if elected, and receive votes on that basis. 
But in the real world of politics the terms of the contract are extremely 
vague, since voters know that politicians will when in office have access to 
detailed information on policies and spending that ordinary voters do not 
have time to gather, and that they will often need to make adjustments to 
what was promised on the basis of new information. The problem is that 
voters will have no way to verify whether a change in policy from what the 
politician had promised was justified in terms of the public good based on 
new information that had come to light, or whether the politician in fact 
always knew that the promise could not be kept, but lied in order to gain 
office, or whether the change in policy is for the politician completely self-
serving, say to appease an influential lobby. In such circumstances, we 
might have better political outcomes if politicians can, on some issues, 
guarantee some policy. An earmarked tax is a way to achieve this. 
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Before jumping to the conclusion that this model is suggesting that politics 
is an utter den of corruption, we should remember that our economy has 
many situations where one party to a contract has a great informational 
advantage over the other party, and so in order to gain confidence finds a 
way to bind herself to certain courses of action. Consider, for example, 
nonprofit organizations in the arts. Arts organizations have an implicit 
contract with donors that donated funds will be devoted to enhancing the 
mission of the organization and not to personally enriching the trustees of 
the organization. Most donors cannot obtain all the information necessary to 
monitor whether this has been done. But donations occur in any case, 
because in adopting the status of “nonprofit” the organization is pledging 
that any excess of revenues over costs cannot be distributed to trustees but 
must be used to further the organization’s mission. Indeed Hansmann (1980) 
considers this “nondistribution constraint” to be the defining feature of the 
nonprofit organization. This is an example where a constraint on behavior 
actually enhances the efficacy of the organization. 
 
So in the context of an earmarked tax for the arts, for example, we should 
think of this as a way for elected officials to make a more credible promise 
to voters than would otherwise be possible. Nobel prize-winning economist 
James Buchanan (1963), famously skeptical of the ability of governments to 
keep promises, and to limit their growth in expenditures, favored earmarking 
as a way of giving some power over spending decisions back to voters. But 
other economists have seen earmarking as a way of overcoming voter 
resistance to tax increases, and so, contrary to Buchanan, as a way of 
increasing expenditures on particular budget items. 
 
For example, Alice Rivlin notes that while in general politicians hoping for a 
lengthy career must not propose tax increases, voters have positive feelings 
about a number of specific government programs – it’s just “government,” 
in the abstract, they don’t like. This leads her to find that: 
 
There is one apparent exception to the tax rule: taxes held in trust 
funds and earmarked for specific purposes can be raised. There was 
no perceptible backlash when the gasoline tax was raised in 1983, 
presumably because the increase was thought necessary to fix the 
roads. While no one would claim payroll taxes are popular, voters 
have tolerated repeated increases in the taxes that fund Social 
Security, including the substantial increases in contributions required 
to shift the Social Security system from a pay-as-you-go mode to the 
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accumulation of surpluses designed to prefund the retirement claims 
of the baby-boom generation (Rivlin, 1989, p. 113). 
 
In a similar vein Le Grand and Bennett (2000) propose that an earmarked 
tax, in their case a percentage point increase in the personal income tax, 
would provide the necessary additional funding for Britain’s cash-starved 
National Health Service, noting that poll results showed eighty percent 
approval for such a tax increase if it were earmarked, but only forty percent 
approval for a tax increase for the general pool of government revenue. 
 
Note that in each of these cases it is not a matter of voters being “duped” 
into accepting a tax increase they otherwise would not approve. Rather, 
voters are willing to accept a tax increase if they have some assurances about 
where the money will be spent. Wilkinson (1994) adds that earmarking can 
have the additional benefits of making the government expenditure process 
more transparent than it would otherwise be, which is good not just for 
achieving a better match between how voters want their money spent and 
how it actually is spent, but also for generally improving the democratic 
ideal. 
 
But if earmarked taxes have these strengths, why do we not observe 
earmarking for all government programs? First, there is a trade-off; as we 
noted earlier, the drawback of earmarked taxes is in some ways the same as 
their strength, that it binds government to a degree in terms of how they can 
spend money. While we might want this for some programs, it is not likely 
to be the case that it would be an efficient system for the entire government 
budget. Second, we also note that if too many programs become based on 
earmarked funding, the government budget as a whole might become larger 
than voters actually want; Kimenyi, Lee and Tollison (1990) point out that 
with extensive use of earmarking, lobbyists for different sectors will be 
turning their energies to trying to secure tax increases, rather than, as is 
usually the case, fighting for a share of a total budget fixed in size. Third, 
earmarking is only effective where it is easy for voters to observe the true 
size of the relevant budget expenditure. This might be the case for a highway 
trust fund, or the Social Security fund, but might be more difficult in other 
cases. Indeed for this reason Rode and Rushton (2002) rejected the idea of 
an earmarked tax for new revenues for the Canadian health care system; it 
would not be feasible for voters to ensure that the new revenues were in fact 
being devoted to health care, and that hidden cuts in health care expenditures 
were not being made elsewhere in the system. Finally, earmarking across all 
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expenditure items would require some way of translating diverse citizen 
preferences over government expenditures into a coherent plan. This might 
be possible over a single expenditure item, but as scholars of voting systems 
have long known, when there are a number of issues to be determined 
simultaneously there are likely to be serious inconsistencies in the social 
choice, even when individual voters are themselves rational and consistent in 
how they vote.  
 
Given all these considerations, what can we say, in general terms, about an 
earmarked tax for the arts? First, for any of the usual tax bases, earmarked 
taxes for the arts will not be like a user fee for a public service, and so 
should not be confused as such.24 Second, it will be an important 
consideration how well the public can actually monitor whether the tax was 
devoted to the arts and whether cuts were not made elsewhere. This may be 
easier for the arts, which has a limited number of branches of government 
making expenditures in the area, than in other fields like health or welfare. 
Third, the fact that the arts are only a small part of the total budget of any 
level of government means that an earmarked tax could be applied without 
binding the government’s entire budget in a way that could be damaging 
should an unforeseen shock to the budget occur. Hsiung (2001) points out 
(using the analogy of the design of submarines) that earmarking can work to 
prevent budget problems in one area, which may be due to unforeseen events 
or perhaps just to poor expenditure management, from spreading to every 
other budgetary item.   
 
Any advocate for an earmarked tax for the arts in Metro Atlanta will need to 
be familiar with the strengths and weaknesses of earmarked taxes. The 
current situation in Georgia is such that residents are very aware of how 
quickly the budgetary fortunes of the state can change, with required cuts to 
valuable public services and the unforeseen need to raise taxes. An 
earmarked tax promises to insulate some part of the budget process from 
fluctuations, and some reason must be provided as to why this is a good 
idea. If voters have a reluctance to adopt an earmarked tax for the arts in 
these uncertain times, that is an indication that there are drawbacks to 
earmarking from the start that need to be addressed. It will not be sufficient 
to simply say that earmarking “protects” the arts, since the government 
                                                 
24 Bös (2000) makes the technical point that if the earmarked tax is chosen by a referendum, then for the 
median voter, whose preference we would expect to be the electoral outcome, the tax is like a user fee, 
since that voter is choosing a level of tax equal to the marginal benefits he will receive from the resulting 
spending, which is the same as what he would choose had there been a market and user fee for the good. 
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budget as a whole cannot be protected in like fashion, and queries will 
immediately be raised as to what entitles the arts to this special treatment in 
the budget process. 
 
That being said, we note that the main experience Georgians have had with 
earmarking, the dedication of lottery revenues to education, has been a 
positive one that maintains substantial positive support. In general, a 
potential problem with earmarking is that if the program being funded has a 
number of sources of revenues, the earmarked funds might simply serve to 
provide a substitute source of revenue rather than provide additional 
revenues; in other words, other funding might be cut as a result of the 
introduction of the earmarked source. But research has found that the 
Georgia lotteries have indeed provided additional, rather than substitute, 
funding for education; this has been attributed to the transparent reporting 
mechanism on the use of funds (Lauth and Robbins, 2002). State law insists 
that the net proceeds of the lottery “shall be used to supplement, not 
supplant, existing resources for educational purposes and programs.” To 
make this enforceable the Georgia Constitution requires that the Governor 
list a separate budget category, “lottery proceeds,” so that citizens can more 
easily observe the pattern of education funding that is not from the lottery. 
 
To our knowledge there are no studies that have attempted to estimate 
whether earmarked taxes for the arts in a city or metropolitan area cause 
decreases in other sources of public funding, and an econometric analysis of 
the question is beyond the scope of this study. Many states this year are 
proposing substantial cuts to their state-level arts boards, including Colorado 
and Utah, states where the major metropolitan area has an earmarked sales 
tax for the arts, but this is surely at least in part to the general fiscal crisis 
facing state governments. 
 
5. Earmarked Taxes for the Arts: Questions for Metro Atlanta 
 
What public interest is served by an earmarked tax for the arts? 
 
This is the most important question of all. If there is no coherent answer, 
then any advocates of an earmarked tax will be left explaining why they 
would want to support a transfer of money from taxpayers in general to 
those who happen to enjoy attending those cultural events that would be 
eligible for funding.  
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It will not be enough to claim that the range of organizations receiving 
funding will be large and attract diverse audiences, because it leaves 
unanswered the question of why funding through the private sector, plus 
what public funding already exists, would not be wholly adequate. 
Furthermore, when the public interest is identified it will not only justify the 
new funding mechanism but will also indicate what sort of allocation 
process is appropriate.  
 
Economists who study the arts have identified a number of reasons why 
public support of the arts, beyond what the private sector alone could 
provide, is justified: 
• Left to the private sector alone, the opportunities to share in the 
cultural life of the region will not be distributed equitably, and 
individuals with low income, or who have not had the benefits of a 
family upbringing or schooling that enable them to fully partake in 
our cultural life, or who live in neighborhoods with few cultural 
offerings, will be missing out on a crucial part of a full life. 
• There are benefits from the arts in the community that accrue through 
the building of social capital: the invisible, informal ties that bind our 
society together. By enhancing the opportunities for different citizens 
to get together, especially in amateur cultural organizations where the 
citizens are actually participating in the activity, not just as spectators, 
we build the social capital that is now seen by many as an important 
determinant of the quality of life in a region (Putnam, 2000; Strom, 
2001). The Urban Institute reports that “frequent participants in arts 
and culture are more likely than less frequent participants to engage in 
other civic activities, such as voting and being a member of a 
voluntary organization or association – that is, to act as ‘community 
connectors’” (Walker, 2002, p. 7). 
• There are in the arts what economists refer to as positive externalities, 
where I will benefit from others taking part in cultural activities even 
when I myself am not a part of those activities in particular. For 
example, I benefit from children having a vibrant arts education 
program in schools, and the opportunity to experience a wide range of 
cultural offerings in the Metro area, because it will improve my 
quality of life to live in a society that is culturally literate and that will 
give support in future to the cultural institutions I value. I will also 
benefit from a culturally vibrant city attracting new residents that will 
add to the cultural and economic life of the region.   
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Each of these reasons has two things in common. 
 
First, they each identify a public interest in the arts, even for those who are 
not regular attendees of events, whether it be in terms of helping those who 
are for various reasons culturally deprived, or of building community, or 
through changing the cultural life of the area in ways that benefit everyone. 
As stated above, it would be very difficult to persuade the voting public to 
support new funding for the arts if the public benefits are not articulated. 
 
Second, each of these reasons has in common an understanding that our 
cultural traditions, and the fostering of new creations and ideas, are not 
simply an entertaining diversion, although being entertained is certainly a 
part of our cultural life. Our culture is at the core of how we define and 
understand our selves and each other. It is how we express or experience a 
vision for which words alone would never be adequate. It is how we are 
connected to our ancestors who came before us and the generations who will 
come after. The arts are different from other goods. 
 
The residents of Metro Atlanta will differ regarding what is the most 
important public interest in the arts. Some may believe that it is most 
important to stress the cultural development of youth, especially for the 
disadvantaged and the at-risk. Arts education programs, artists-in-schools, 
and after-school programs will be a funding priority. Others will see the 
most gain in the development of community, especially through the 
sustainable funding of small arts nonprofit organizations. Still others might 
believe that directing attention to the pursuit of artistic excellence is the best 
way to maintain our traditions and inspire future generations. No doubt for 
many people all of these goals will be important, but there will be 
differences in where new public funding could do the most good. 
 
A coherent proposal for an earmarked tax will include an identification of 
the public interest in the arts in Atlanta, and from that the criteria for how 
funds would be allocated should naturally follow.25 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 The classic critique of an arts council without a clear sense of purpose is King and Blaug (1976); see 
Schuster (2001) for a revisiting of that paper, and reiteration that the question of public purpose can still 
confound arts policy-makers. 
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What are the implications of Metro Atlanta’s geography? 
 
As we saw in the Kansas City case, and in Detroit, concerns will inevitably 
be raised about what taxpayers will contribute to the earmarked tax and 
where the funds will be spent. Metro Atlanta’s transportation challenges are, 
we believe, obvious enough to be taken as a given. Residents distant from 
central Atlanta will raise questions as to whether they will be paying a tax to 
fund arts organizations in the city from which they expect to receive few 
benefits. This takes us back to the previous question: what is the public 
interest in the arts funding?  
 
If the argument is that funding for nonprofit arts organizations is a way to 
build social capital through greater citizen participation, then it will be 
important that the funds from the dedicated revenue source be distributed 
throughout the area covered by the tax, since the essence of social capital is 
in its being local.  
 
If the public interest is in creating greater equality of opportunity to acquire 
cultural experiences, then some geographic redistribution would be called 
for as culturally deprived areas would ideally be the location of more 
allocations than the amounts collected in taxes there, or, perhaps more 
allocations would be made to central cultural organizations well-placed to 
serve the needs of the disadvantaged groups.  
 
If the public interest is in having some “world class” institutions, then likely 
there will be a geographic redistribution from suburbs and exurbs to the City 
of Atlanta (however, a recent report on the arts and suburbs in Minnesota 
suggested that “suburban arts development cannot be limited to classes and 
amateur performances, no matter how worthwhile. Minneapolis and St. Paul 
may – and perhaps should not – forever be the repositories for all art of a 
certain type or quality” (Bye, 2002)).  
 
What are the implications of Metro Atlanta’s cultural diversity? 
 
Economists have found that when there are wide differences in public 
preferences over what goods and services should be funded through 
government, there will tend to be less provision of those public goods. That 
is not a very surprising result. But more disturbing, economists have also 
found that the greater the degree of ethnic diversity in a jurisdiction, the less 
provision we will have a public goods and services. Citizens are less willing 
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to agree on collective action when there are ethnic divisions. This has been 
found to hamper economic development in poor countries (Easterly, 2002), 
but has also been found to apply to the US, where the more ethnically 
diverse counties will tend to spend less on core public infrastructure 
(Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999), welfare (Luttmer, 2001), and schools 
(Poterba, 1997).   
 
Of the twenty cities in the Kushner and Brooks (2000) Research Atlanta 
study, Atlanta had the highest share of minority population. If the racial 
differences are accompanied by differences in thinking about what kinds of 
cultural programs warrant funding, it may be very difficult to reach 
consensus on a new funding program in the arts. 
 
Cultural diversity comes in many forms, and works across the different 
tastes people have for the different genres of art. In a forthcoming paper 
Rushton (2003) shows that as cultural tastes become more varied, and as 
there is less consensus on the particular cultural value of the high arts versus 
popular art, the case for public funding becomes more difficult to make.  
 
When economists first began studying the rationale for public funding of the 
arts, in the 1960s and 1970s, there was an implicit assumption about what 
was meant by “the arts”: it was a very particular artistic heritage, the high art 
tradition of Western Europe. But that assumption can no longer be made. 
 
This does not mean that it will be impossible to secure agreement on a new 
source of sustainable funding for the arts in Metro Atlanta. But it does mean 
that there is a challenge that needs to be addressed. Other cities with cultural 
diversity have been able to create very successful arts funding systems. But, 
as Kushner and Brooks (2000) note, a “frank discussion about the interplay 
between race, the arts, and philanthropy in Atlanta would probably be 
useful. The confluence of a high minority population and a high degree of 
(largely white) suburbanization may be depressing support for any cultural 
establishment in the city that focuses on the ‘classical arts’” (p. 28).  
 
How should funds be allocated? 
     
Should the allocation process be competitive? We can predict how existing 
arts institutions might approach this question. They will see a cost in the 
administrative work of preparing documents annually for a funding 
competition, and a potential cost, but also a potential gain in the results of 
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the funding. The possible costs here are that if the new earmarked tax comes 
into play and the organization does poorly in the competition, it might 
actually lose revenues as private donations fall off and, perhaps, other 
sources of government funding go into decline. However, from a public 
interest perspective there is much to be said for competition, even for large 
organizations. It forces arts organizations to document how it is that they are 
serving a public interest (see Gilhespy (2001) and Schuster (1997) for a look 
at how indicators of success at achieving public interest goals can be applied 
to arts organizations), it provides citizens with a greater sense of 
accountability to the public, and, often overlooked, it gives new arts 
organizations a chance to gain a foothold. Anheier and Toepler (1998) note 
that one half of American art museums have been founded since 1970; this is 
not a static sector, and it is worthwhile to ask whether the funding allocation 
process should reflect this. 
 
What arts organizations should be eligible for funding? Once again we are 
asked to consider the purpose of public funding to guide us in answering a 
question. The St. Louis ZMD is a model that focuses on very secure funding 
for a few large organizations, and it seems to have a clear idea of what will 
be accomplished through that: world class institutions available for free 
admission, and many educational programs, for its citizens. Denver, after 
initially proposing such a model, funds a very large number of organizations, 
and ensures grants to community arts organizations in the suburban counties. 
Once the purpose of the public funding is determined, the answer to this 
question should be clearer. 
 
Should the allocations extend beyond the arts? It has been noted in informal 
discussions with administrators of earmarked taxes that it is generally easier 
to secure new funding for the arts if there is some way of including the local 
zoo in the process. It is not difficult to see why; the demographic of middle- 
and low-income families with young children will often find the zoo is the 
most accessible cultural institution for the family to enjoy. If the purpose of 
the earmarked tax is to ensure broad equality of access to cultural 
institutions, this might be justified. Also, if institutions like the zoo are an 
important contributor to social capital, in terms of bringing people together 
in a relaxed, enjoyable atmosphere such that stronger ties are felt for the 
community, there could be a justification there as well. But we are reminded 
one last time to ask what is the purpose of public funding for the institution; 
indeed we might find that culture should be given a broad definition. 
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Who Should Make the Allocation Decision? 
 
There are three distinct methods of allocating funds, which might be used in 
some combination. 
 
One method is to specify the allocation of funds to specified cultural 
organizations at the outset, so that while a commission may exist to oversee 
the transfer of funds, the commission is not engaged in any decision-making 
over the allocation. An example would be the ZMD in St. Louis. 
 
A second method is to grant the new funds from the earmarked tax to an 
existing arts council or group of councils, to supplement its existing 
programs, which are generally conducted on a competitive basis. An 
example in this case is the Greater Columbus (Ohio) Arts Council, which 
receives a portion of the local occupancy tax and allocates funds on a 
competitive basis. 
 
The third method is to allocate funds through some body that exists only for 
the purpose of allocating the earmarked revenues, for example the Scientific 
and Cultural Facilities District in Denver. Such a body might allocate its 
funds entirely on a competitive basis, or, as is the case in Denver, through a 
variety of means: statutory allocation to large organizations, a competitive 
process for medium-sized organizations, and funding for community-based 
arts organizations being handled by local government. 
 
Metropolitan Atlanta has a number of arts funding bodies already in place, 
and so a key question would be, if an earmarked tax were adopted, and some 
aspect of the allocation of funds were to be competitive, should some new 
body be created? A new funding body would make sense if the purpose of 
the funding were different from what is typically the goal of programs by the 
county arts councils or the Metropolitan Atlanta Arts Fund. For example, the 
goal of the new funding might be to foster more collaborative projects across 
organizations, if this were seen as a deficiency under the status quo. 
 
How Much Revenue Could be Raised in Metro Atlanta? 
 
It is always a difficult task to estimate the revenues that could be raised from 
the application of an earmarked tax. First, the tax base is constantly shifting 
due to population changes or changes in general economic conditions. The 
hotel occupancy tax will suffer additional variation depending on the 
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performance of that sector. Second, changes in the tax rates themselves will 
cause changes in the tax base. If increases in property tax mill rates are 
accompanied by reductions in property values, as we would expect they 
would be, then in the long term the revenues raised by an increase in the mill 
rate will be less than the number we would reach by applying a hypothetical 
mill rate increase to the existing tax base. 
 
That being said, the estimation problems are most likely less for the sales tax 
base than for other tax bases, and on those grounds we can do some rough 
calculations. The seven-county Metropolitan Denver Scientific and Cultural 
Facilities District, and Salt Lake County in Utah, each levy an earmarked 
one-tenth of a sales tax point for the arts and culture. In Denver this tax 
raises about $15 per person, and in Salt Lake about $17 per person. If an 
earmarked tax could be designed that would raise $16 per person in Clayton, 
Cobb, DeKalb, Fulton and Gwinnett counties, with a combined population 
of just over three million persons, total revenues would be about $50 
million. 
 
Some caveats are in order in the interpretation of the $50 million figure. 
 
First, it is an approximation. Gwinnett county, for example, has only had its 
1% county sales tax in place since 2001 (the total rate in Gwinnett is 6%, 
with the 4% state rate, 1% to the Board of Education, and 1% to the county). 
Revenues fluctuate widely, but an estimate over those months is revenues 
around $19 per person per year per one-tenth of one percent sales tax. 
DeKalb county has a total sales tax rate of 7% (since unlike Gwinnett it also 
has a 1% tax devoted to MARTA), and revenues there for 2002 from the 1% 
sales tax that goes to the county indicate that one-tenth of one percent sales 
tax yields about $12.40 per person. So, although it is an approximation, $16 
per person from one-tenth of one percent of sales tax in the five combined 
counties is not going to be wildly off the mark. 
 
Second, both Denver and Salt Lake use their earmarked revenues for a wide 
range of cultural activities: in Denver over 40% of the revenues raised go to 
the Museum of Science and Nature, the Zoo, and the Botanical Gardens, and 
in Salt Lake over 40% of the revenues go to the Zoo and the Department of 
Parks and Recreation. So if Metro Atlanta were looking for an earmarked tax 
specifically for the arts, one-tenth of one percent of sales tax is actually 
substantially more revenue per person for the arts than is raised in Denver or 
Salt Lake. 
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Third, following from the second point, it is important to remember that 
sound policy in the arts requires thinking about what programs would best 
serve the interests of the community, and the degree to which public funding 
would need to be a part of those programs, before looking into what revenue 
could be raised from different sources. Only after discussion of the issues 
raised in previous parts of the paper would it make sense to ask what sort of 
earmarked tax if any is appropriate, and what the revenue target ought to be.    
6. Conclusion 
 
Economists have found that the public seems to have more willingness to 
accept taxes, especially new taxes, when they are earmarked for a particular 
purpose. In the arts, we have seen evidence from a number of US cities 
where earmarked taxes for the arts receive strong voter approval both for 
their implementation and their renewal.  
 
Whether that same support would be found in Metro Atlanta depends on a 
number of factors. Cities where proposals for earmarked taxes for the arts 
have failed to gain approval show us that questions about how funds will be 
distributed across a region, and what the purpose of the funding is, must be 
answered before voters will be willing to give their support. 
 
Beyond this, there needs to be an articulation of the public interest in the 
arts, and in turn what will be the criteria for funded projects. And in 
particular, defining the public interest in the arts will require some 
consensus-building across cultural groups. This is a challenge, but it has 
been done elsewhere, and the different cultural communities of Atlanta 
could benefit in many ways from a discussion of our common interest in 
preserving, experiencing, and enhancing our cultural life. 
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